Incident Debrief︱Russian Funding of US and Canadian Political Influencers
On September 4, 2024, the United States Department of Justice indicted two Russian nationals for allegedly funding a media company, now identified as Tenet Media, for covertly funding and spreading Russian propaganda. Tenet Media was founded by two Canadians, Lauren Chen and Liam Donovan, who reportedly accepted $10 million USD from Russian sources through their online American and Canadian networks and platforms. Five Americans (Benny Johnson, Dave Rubin, Tim Pool, Matt Christiansen, Tayler Hansen) and one Canadian (Lauren Southern) were recruited and joined Tenet Media for its launch in November 2023 (we refer to this group as the Tenet Media influencers). You can see the full timeline here.
This incident (hereafter the Russian Tenet Media case or incident) highlights the ongoing and prevalent threat of Russian interference and influence in the Canadian information ecosystem.
The Canadian Digital Media Research Network responded to this event with an investigation that produced eight incident updates. We conclude our investigation with this debrief — while noting that this is unlikely to be the last we hear about Russian or other foreign funding of influencers who are consequential for Canadian political discourse.
Incident Assessment
This moderate incident highlights an important pathway and vulnerability in the information ecosystem: the ability of foreign actors to influence and manipulate Canadians using Canadian and non-Canadian social media influencers. The Tenet Media operation primarily targeted US-based social media personalities, but nevertheless heavily impacted Canadians due to the attention they pay to the US information ecosystem and its major influencers [IU2].
Russia appears to have targeted a specific set of influencers through Tenet Media that:
1. have decidedly pro-Russian views and sympathies;
2. produce divisive and polarizing content that aligns with stated Russian objectives; and
3. are influential and popular voices in a specific and largely online community.
We observe that Russia is funding these influencers to try and sway the information they produce and share and, subsequently, the beliefs and attitudes of their audiences and communities. Those online communities contain many Canadian voices and listeners. Despite significant coverage of these events, Canadians who are part of those online communities are unlikely to have heard about Russian funding or influence, and even if they have heard of it, they may distrust official institutions discussing the campaign’s attempts to influence them. This very skepticism is part of the campaign’s effectiveness in eroding trust and shaping narratives within these communities [IU5].
A critical concern is any real or perceived Russian influence over Canadian politicians or other institutional actors. Similar to the Kirkland Lake bot incident, there was a near-immediate linking of foreign interference to partisan politics in the online discourse: in the two weeks following the indictment, the online conversation linked the revelations with Pierre Poilievre and the Conservative Party of Canada [IU7]. We find no evidence of such a link: there are minimal public interactions between Tenet Media influencers and Canadian politicians. Moreover, no Canadian politician regularly produces content online that is comparable to that of the Tenet Media influencers or in their online ideological neighbourhood [IU6].
While we see no direct influence on Canadian politicians, this case does pose a significant cause for concern as the Tenet Media influencers have influenced the Canadian information ecosystem in three important ways:
1. Directly reaching Canadians
Many Canadians directly consume content produced by Tenet Media influencers. For example, approximately one quarter of Canadians are able to identify at least one Tenet Media influencer from their picture [IU5]. Online influencers, within and across borders, are increasingly becoming important political actors that can leverage their platforms to disseminate disinformation and shape public discourse [IU3], and they are doing so in the Canadian context.
2. Reaching Canadians through Canadian influencers
The Tenet Media influencers are popular online voices and are central to an online ideological neighbourhood which includes many prominent Canadian voices [IU6]. Their influence is fur- ther amplified beyond their core audience through their interactions with and influence over prominent Canadian voices. We found that Canadian influencers that closely align with Tenet Media in the online information ecosystem echo and amplify their content across multiple degrees of separation, extending their reach and influence to Canadians who may not directly follow Tenet Media influencers [IU3].
3. Through shaping perceptions of Canadian public policy
Across all podcasts produced by Tenet Media influencers, we found regular and intense criticism of Canadian public policy and Canadian politicians. Canada was rarely discussed in a positive light, and claims that undermine trust in Canadian institutions were frequently made [IU4]. Through their podcasts and other content, the Tenet Media influencers regularly sow distrust in Canadian (and more generally, Western) democracy, public policy, and political leaders: all stated objectives of the Russian operation.
This incident has been classified here as moderate, in view of the financial resourcing behind the information operation, the reach of the impacted influencers, and the covert editorial control of content by Russian operatives [IU1]. We do not consider the incident to have met the threshold for a major incident given the lack of implication by, or direct influence over, institutional Canadian political actors, and the limited informed complicity of the impacted influencers.
Lessons Learned
The Russian funding of Tenet Media is a sobering reminder of the wide range of tactics available to those seeking to manipulate the Canadian and international information ecosystem. While Tenet Media itself did not produce highly engaging content and Russian involvement was publicized rapidly, the democratic implications of the incident are considerable. We highlight four significant lessons learned.
1. Influencers are a potent vector for foreign information operations
Social media influencers, particularly those with established ideological leanings and significant online followings, represent a critical and unaddressed vulnerability in the Canadian information ecosystem [IU1, IU2, and IU3]. In the case of Tenet Media, it seems as though Russian operatives identified and targeted influencers with demonstrated pro-Russian sympathies that were already embedded within ideological communities (that contained many Canadian voices and listeners) [IU4, IU5, and IU8]. It appears that this strategy was used to amplify Russian-aligned narratives by leveraging the credibility and organic reach of these influencers. Despite public exposure of their funding sources, the impacted influencers and their communities have responded defensively and dismissively to calls for reflection. The Canadian public is fortunate that the US indictment publicly revealed this funding, but detecting operations exploiting the reach of influencers is extremely challenging.
2. The Canadian information ecosystem is particularly vulnerable to US-based dynamics and influence
The interconnected nature of the US and Canadian information ecosystems poses a unique challenge to the Canadian context. The US has historically been a major target of foreign influence operations and any such operations are extremely likely to have second-order impacts in the Canadian context. In this case, the Tenet Media influencers generally have extremely low interest in and knowledge of the Canadian context, public policy or current events, but nevertheless talk about Canada often and are hyper-critical of Canadian public policy [IU4]. The enabling and amplification of such narratives creates significant challenges for Canadian policymakers attempting to counteract foreign interference and safeguarding domestic discourse.
3. Communities with narrow information streams are particularly vulnerable
Among the many online communities being targeted by foreign influence, this case highlights how specific communities are uniquely vulnerable. Those who consumed Tenet Media content were unaware of its covert Russian funding, and even after the indictment and subsequent coverage, those most familiar with Tenet Media influencers did not necessarily hear about the allegations or make the connection with foreign influence [IU5]. Conversely, those who did learn about the indictment were not those who were aware of, nor followed, the implicated influencers. Those informed of the incident were significantly more likely to regard it as a threat to future Canadian elections than those less familiar with the details of the funding scheme. While in this instance it is an ideological community, linguistic or platform-based communities could also be vulnerable targets. Narrow and homogenous information environments are ripe for foreign actors to exploit. Leaders within such communities may resist acknowledging foreign targeting, further complicating efforts to raise awareness and build resilience.
4. How Canadians respond to information incidents continues to make the problem worse
The way Canadians and the influencers responded to this incident provides key insights into the attitudes and behaviours that emerge in response to foreign influence and interference events. Following the release of Tenet Media indictment, online discussion linked the incident to the Conservative Party of Canada and its leadership through the use of #PierrePutin and associated hashtags and narratives [IU7]. Beyond the wider response by the public, the influencers directly involved have trivialized legitimate concerns raised about their awareness of the Russian funding of Tenet Media and the editorial control exerted over Tenet Media content, instead framing themselves as the victims of a Russian information operation. Having Canadians and influencers respond to foreign interference in such a partisan and dismissive manner demonstrates a disconnect from the seriousness of the matter and also constrains our ability to learn from these incidents. The nature of our online discourse and the way in which foreign interference is frequently politicized in Canada engenders distrust and blame, and limits opportunities for reflection and collective improvement.
For media inquiries, please contact Isabelle Corriveau at isabelle.corriveau2@mcgill.ca.